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Abstract. We propose a keyless and lightweight message transforma-
tion scheme based on the combinatorial design theory for the conden-
tiality of a message transmitted in multiple parts through a network
with multiple independent paths, or for data stored in multiple parts by
a set of independent storage services such as the cloud providers. Our
combinatorial scheme disperses a message into v output parts so that (k-
1) or less parts do not reveal any information about any message part,
and the message can only be recovered by the party who possesses all
v output parts. Combinatorial scheme generates an xor transformation
structure to disperse the message into v output parts. Inversion is done
by applying the same xor transformation structure on output parts. The
structure is generated using generalized quadrangles from design theory
which represents symmetric point and line incidence relations in a pro-
jective plane. We randomize our solution by adding a random salt value
and dispersing it together with the message. We show that a passive ad-
versary with capability of accessing k 1 communication links or storage
services has no advantage so that the scheme is indistinguishable under
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2).
1 Introduction
We introduce a message dispersal scheme based on the combinatorial design
theory where symmetric point and line incidence relations from a projective
plane are used to decide which input message data parts should be added (xor) to
obtain an output message part so that same addition on the output message parts
can recover the original message part. For a passive adversary who can not access
all message parts, scheme provides perfect secrecy. The scheme can be used to
send messages securely through multi-path networks or to store a le on multiple
independent public storage sites. Benet of the solution is the removal of the key
management overhead. In fact, recently it has been shown that post-deployment
key establishment problem in wireless ad hoc networks is in NP-hard and it
does not accept polynomial time approximation scheme PTAS [1]. In the rest of
the paper, we will introduce preliminaries, present details of our combinatorial
message dispersal scheme and provide analysis for the correctness, complexity
and security of the scheme, and cover the related work. In appendix, we provide
details for constructing generalized quadrangles and an example combinatorial
message dispersal scheme based on the generalized quadrangles GQ(2,2).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Denitions and Relations
We refer members of f0; 1g as a message (i.e., m 2 f0; 1g). Size of a message
is denoted as jmj. Each message m is represented as the concatenation of v   1
equal size parts m = m1jjm2jj : : : jjmv 1, called input message parts. Salt s  
R(f0; 1g) represents a random bit sequence generated by a pseudo random num-
ber generator R. H() represents a collision-resistant hash function and H(sjji)
for i 2 [1; v 1] produces v 1 random bit sequences the same size as the message
parts and output parts. Initial processing of the message adds (xor) salt values to
each message part to obtain randomized message parts n = n1jjn2jj : : : jjnv 1jjnv
where ni = mi  H(sjji) for i 2 [1; v   1], nv = s and n =
L
j2[1;v] nj . Our
combinatorial dispersal scheme transforms randomized message parts into v out-
put message parts represented as o = o1jjo2jj : : : jjovjjov+1 where ov+1 = n and
joij = jmij for i 2 [1; v + 1]. We refer k as the number of output message parts
needed to recover an input message part. Later we will show that having less
than k output message parts will not give adversary any advantage.
The transformation is build upon a set of blocks Bi 2 B for i 2 [1; b] repre-
senting symmetric point-line incidence relation in a projective space. Each block
(a.k.a. line) represents a nite set of objects (a.k.a. points). Bi is called a super
block, and it is dened as the union of blocks which has the same object i as
their element, Bi =
S
8j s:t: i2Bj Bj n fig. Super blocks Bi are used by both
the transformation and the inverse transformation algorithms. In the following
subsection, we discuss the properties of these blocks and provide an algorithm
to construct them in polynomial time in Appendix A.
Combinatorial message dispersal scheme CMD = (B, R, H, T , T  ) with
the associated input message space M 2 f0; 1g and output message space
O 2 f0; 1g consists of ve algorithms (Figure 1). Combinatorial block design
algorithm B returns a set of super blocks. Pseudo random number generation
algorithm R returns a random bit sequence, called a salt, the same size as a
message part. Hash function H accepts salt concatenated with the message part
sequence number and returns a bit sequence the same size as the message part.R
and H are used to randomize the transformation scheme so that the same input
message will be transformed to a dierent output message each time. Transfor-
mation algorithm T takes a set of blocks generated by B (may use randomization
for creating v! isomorphic designs), the salt value generated by R, and hashed
salt values per input message part generated by H. T transforms input mes-
sage and disperses it to output message parts as T (B;R;H;M) ! O. Inverse
transformation algorithm T   takes the set of blocks generated by B, output
message parts and uses hash algorithm H to reconstruct the input message as
T  (B;H;O)!M.
2.2 Generalized Quadrangles (GQ)
A Finite Generalized Quadrangle GQ(s; t) is an incidence structure S = (P;B; I)
where P and B are disjoint and nonempty sets of points and lines respectively,
Fig. 1. Combinatorial
message dispersal scheme
CMD=(B, R, H, T , T  )
with ve algorithms: com-
binatorial design algorithm
B, pseudo random number
generation algorithm R, hash
function H, transformation
algorithm T , inverse trans-
formation algorithm T  , salt
s, message part sequence
number i, input message m
and output message o.
and I is a symmetric point-line incidence relation satisfying the following three
axioms [2, 3].
Axiom 1 Each point is incident with t+1 lines (t  1) and two distinct points
are incident with at most one line.
Axiom 2 Each line is incident with s+ 1 points (s  1) and two distinct lines
are incident with at most one point.
Axiom 3 If x is a point and L is a line not incident with x, then there is a
unique pair (y;M) 2 P B for which x I M I y I L.
In a GQ(s; t), there are v = (s + 1)(st + 1) points and b = (t + 1)(st + 1)
lines where each line includes s + 1 points, and each point appears on t + 1
lines. We present three suitable GQs as dened in [2, 3]: (1) GQ(q; q) from the
projective space PG(4; q), (2) GQ(q; q2) from the projective space PG(5; q), and
(3) GQ(q2; q3) from the projective space PG(4; q2). For the rest of the paper,
we mainly focus on GQ(s; t) = GQ(q; q). We map lines to blocks and points to
objects (line - block and point - object will be used interchangeably throughout
the paper) where there are v = b = (q + 1)(q2 + 1) blocks and objects. Each
block contains s+1 = q+1 objects, and each object is contained in t+1 = q+1
blocks. Remaining GQ parameters are given in Table 1 of the Appendix A.
Example 1. Consider GQ(s; t) = GQ(2; 2) for q = 2. There are v = b = 15 blocks
and objects where each block contains s + 1 = 3 objects and each object is in
t+ 1 = 3 blocks. Assume the set of objects P = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11;
12; 13; 14; 15g (0 is replaced with 15 for convenience). Based on the Algorithm
3 of the Appendix A, the blocks are:
f11; 12; 15g1, f3; 4; 15g2, f2; 11; 14g3, f1; 7; 9g4, f1; 11; 13g5,
f1; 3; 5g6, f4; 10; 13g7, f2; 3; 6g8, f5; 10; 12g9, f4; 9; 14g10,
f2; 7; 10g11, f6; 8; 13g12, f6; 9; 12g13, f5; 8; 14g14, f7; 8; 15g15.
Blocks f3; 4; 15g and f1; 7; 9g do not share an object. But, there are three other
blocks sharing an object with each: (i) block f7; 8; 15g shares objects 15 and 7,
(ii) block f1; 3; 5g shares objects 3 and 1, and (iii) block f4; 9; 14g shares objects
4 and 9. ut
Blocks obtained by permuting the objects preserves properties of GQ(s; t).
We will name such designs as isomorphic designs. For a GQ(s; t), it is possible
to generate v! = ((s + 1)(st + 1))! isomorphic designs which can be used in
randomization. Below, we introduce three properties of generalized quadrangles
which we use to construct our combinatorial message dispersal scheme.
Proposition 1. If x 2 P is a point and Bx = f8yj9M 2 B and x I M I yg is
the set of all points that are incident with the same line as x, then each line in
B is incident with exactly one point in Bx.
Proof. This proposition is the direct result of the Axiom 3. For a given point
x 2 P , a line N 2 B must be either incident to x, or it must be incident to
exactly one point y where x I M I y for a line M 2 B and M 6= N meaning
also that y 2 Bx. Note that if y 2 Bx, then x 2 By due to the symmetry of the
design. Moreover, jBxj = s(t+ 1) for all x 2 P because x is incident with t+ 1
lines (Axiom 1), and each one of these lines is incident with s points other than
x (Axiom 2). For the rest of the paper, we will call such Bx as super blocks (or
super sets) and use them in building xor structures for our transformation and
inverse transformation. ut
Example 2. Consider the v = b = 15 blocks and objects of the GQ(s; t) =
GQ(2; 2) in the Example 1. Super blocks corresponding to these blocks and
objects are as follows:
B1 = f3; 5; 7; 9; 11; 13g, B2 = f3; 6; 7; 10; 11; 14g, B3 = f1; 2; 4; 5; 6; 15g,
B4 = f3; 9; 10; 13; 14; 15g, B5 = f1; 3; 8; 10; 12; 14g, B6 = f2; 3; 8; 9; 12; 13g,
B7 = f1; 2; 8; 9; 10; 15g, B8 = f5; 6; 7; 13; 14; 15g, B9 = f1; 4; 6; 7; 12; 14g,
B10 = f2; 4; 5; 7; 12; 13g, B11 = f1; 2; 12; 13; 14; 15g, B12 = f5; 6; 9; 10; 11; 15g,
B13 = f1; 4; 6; 8; 10; 11g, B14 = f2; 4; 5; 8; 9; 11g, B15 = f3; 4; 7; 8; 11; 12g.
Proposition 2. If x 2 P is a point and Bx = f8yj9M 2 B and x I M I yg is
the set of all points that are incident with the same line as x, then
S
y2Bx B
y = P
meaning that union of the super blocks referred by the elements of the Bx includes
all points of the design.
Proof. Assume that there is a point z which is not a member of any such super
block By where y 2 Bx. That means, there is a line that z is incident with but
this line is not incident with any point in Bx. This contradicts with the Axiom
3. Therefore,
S
y2Bx B
y includes all the points in the design. ut
Example 3. Consider the super blocks of the Example 2. Let x = 1 and B1 =
f3; 5; 7; 9; 11; 13g1, then B3 [ B5 [ B7 [B9 [ B11 [ B13 = P = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5;
6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14; 15g. ut
Proposition 3. If x 2 P is a point and Bx = f8yj9M 2 B and x I M I yg is
the set of all points that are incident with the same line as x, then:
1. a point is a member of exactly s(t+ 1) super blocks,
2. x is a member of s(t+ 1) super blocks Bz where z 2 Bx,
3. a point y 2 Bx is a member of s  1 super blocks Bz where z 2 Bx,
4. a point y 2 Bx is a member of st+ 1 super blocks Bz where z 2 P nBx,
5. a point y 2 P nBx is a member of t+ 1 super blocks Bz where z 2 Bx, and
6. a point y 2 P n Bx is a member of (s   1)(t + 1) super blocks Bz where
z 2 P nBx.
Proof. Properties 1 and 2 follow Axioms 1 and 2. A point x can be incident with
t+ 1 lines, and each of these lines are incident with s other points; therefore, x
is an element for s(t+ 1) super blocks. Property 2 also follows the symmetry of
the design. Since z 2 Bx implies that x 2 Bz and jBxj = s(t + 1), then there
must be s(t+ 1) super blocks which have x as their elements.
In GQ, a pair of points can be incident with the same line exactly once and
each line is incident with s+1 points. If x and y are two points which are incident
with a line, the same line must be incident with additional s   1 other points.
Property 3 follows this and states that such a point y 2 Bx must be member of
s  1 other super blocks Bz where z 2 Bx. Property 4 is a result of properties 1
and 3, a point y 2 Bx is a member of exactly s(t+ 1) super blocks: s  1 super
blocks Bz where z 2 Bx and st+ 1 super blocks Bz where z 2 P nBx.
In property 5, due to Axiom 3, if a point z is not in super block Bx, then
there must be t+ 1 points in Bx which refer to t+ 1 super blocks that include
the point z as their elements. Property 6 is a result of properties 1 and 5, a point
y 2 P n Bx is a member of exactly s(t + 1) super blocks: t + 1 super sets Bz
where z 2 Bx and (s  1)(t+ 1) super sets Bz where z 2 P nBx.
Note also that for even s and t values, s(t+1) (properties 1 and 2) becomes
an even number whereas s  1 (property 3), st+ 1 (property 4), t+ 1 (property
5) and (s   1)(t + 1) (property 6) become odd numbers. Odd and even nature
of these numbers will be used in building xor structures for transformation and
inverse transformation algorithms. ut
Example 4. Consider the super blocks of the Example 2. Let x = 1 and B1 =
f3; 5; 7; 9; 11; 13g1, then consider the super blocks (B3, B5, B7, B9, B11, B13)
of the elements in B1:
1. Each point is a member of exactly s(t + 1) = 6 out of (s + 1)(st + 1) = 15
super blocks (property 1).
2. Point 1 is a member of s(t+ 1) = 6 super blocks: B3, B5, B7, B9, B11 and
B13 where f3; 5; 7; 9; 11; 13g = B1 (property 2).
3. A point 3 2 B1 is a member of s   1 = 1 super block: B5 where 5 2 B1
(property 3).
4. A point 3 2 B1 is a member of st+1 = 5 super blocks: B1, B2, B4, B6 and
B15 where f1; 2; 4; 6; 15g  P nB1 (property 4).
5. A point 2 2 P n B1 is a member of t + 1 = 3 super blocks: B3,B7 and B11
where f3; 7; 11g  B1 (property 5).
6. A point 2 2 p n B1 is a member of (s   1)(t + 1) = 3 super blocks: B6,B10
and B14 where f6; 10; 14g  P nB1 (property 6). ut
3 Combinatorial Message Dispersal
Combinatorial message dispersal scheme CMD=(B, R, H, T , T  ) is a ve tuple
as illustrated in Figure 1. Combinatorial block design algorithm is based on the
nite generalized quadrangle GQ(s; t) = GQ(q; q) which is a set of jBj = b = q3+
q2+q+1 blocks B = fB1; B3; : : : ; Bbg and a set of jP j = v = q3+q2+q+1 objects
P = f1; 2; : : : ; vg where each block contains q+1 objects. We require parameters
s = t = q be an even prime or prime power. Blocks (a.k.a. lines) and objects
(a.k.a. points) in the design represent the symmetric point-line incidence relation
in a projective space. Axioms 1 - 2 - 3 and Propositions 1 - 2 - 3 make generalized
quadrangles a good candidate for designing xor based transformation structures
to disperse a sequence of input message parts into output message parts so that:
(1) a single output message part does not reveal any information about the any
parts of the input message, (2) message can only be recovered if all the output
message parts are available to the receiver, (3) adversary accessing k   1 or
less output message parts can not extract any useful information about an input
message part, and (4) transformation and inverse transformation can be achieved
in linear time (to the message size in bits) using xor transformation structures.
Based on this, we dene following mappings from generalized quadrangles to
message dispersal:
Generalized Quadrangles )Combinatorial Message Dispersal
Set of v = (s+ 1)(st+ 1) objects ) Input Messagem 2 f0; 1g divided into v parts.
An object (point) ) An input message part mi for i 2 [1; v].
A block (line) Bi = fi1; : : : ; is+1g ) A set of input message parts fmi1 ; : : : ;mis+1g
which contributes with a part to each super set.
A super block Bi = fi1; : : : ; is(t+1)g ) A super set of input message parts to be added
(xor) to obtain the output message part oi.
Axioms 1-2-3 and Proposition 1 ) A transformation algorithm (xor structure)
that maps input message parts referred by the
super set Bi to the output message part oi.
Axioms 1-2-3 and Proposition 2-3 ) An inverse transformation algorithm (xor
structure) that maps output message parts re-
ferred by the super set Bi to the input message
part mi.
3.1 Transformation
Deterministic version of the combinatorial message dispersal scheme CMD =
(B, T , T  ) consists of combinatorial block design algorithm B, transformation
algorithm T and inverse transformation algorithm T  . Deterministic transfor-
mation produces the same output for the same input message at each iteration.
Moreover, repeated message parts or static message structures within the mes-
sage may be reected to one or more output message parts providing advantages
to the adversary. We consider two complementary methods for randomization
to resolve these issues. First, design algorithm can be used along with a pseudo
random number generator to create a unique isomorphic design for each itera-
tion of the scheme. Second, a random salt value can be dispersed along with the
message. Our randomized scheme described below follows the latter.
Randomized version of the combinatorial message dispersal scheme CMD =
(B, R, H, T , T  ) introduces additional two algorithms: pseudo random number
generation algorithm R and a collision-resistant hash function H. It accepts an
input message m = m1jjm2jj : : : jjmv 1 with v 1 parts. As illustrated in Figure
1, it uses block design algorithm B to generate a design based on the GQ(s; t)
with v = (s + 1)(st + 1) objects, b = (t + 1)(st + 1) blocks and v super blocks.
For randomization, transformation algorithm T uses R to generate a salt s, and
adds hash of the salt and the message part sequence number to each message
part. Salt is then appended and dispersed together with the input message parts.
Overall algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 1. Through steps 3 to 5, hash of the
salt s and the sequence number i are added to the message part mi to obtain
randomized message parts ni. Next, the salt is appended to randomized message
parts. Randomized message parts are added (xor) to generate the sum n in step
7. In steps 8 to 10, randomized message parts referred by the super block Bi
are added (xor) to obtain output message part oi for all i 2 [1; v]. Result of the
randomized transformation is the output message parts oi for i 2 [1; v] and n.
An example of the randomized transformation algorithm for GQ(2,2) is provided
in the Appendix B.
Algorithm 1 Randomized Transformation
Require: GQ(s; t) with super blocks fB1; B2; : : : ; Bvg from Algorithm 3
Require: R fpseudo random number generatorg
Require: H(; ) fcollision-resistant hash functiong
Require: m 2 f0; 1g finput messageg
1: s R(f0; 1g) fsaltg
2: m1jjm2jj : : : jjmv 1  m
3: for i 2 [1; v   1] do
4: ni  mi H(sjji)
5: end for
6: nv  s fappend s as the vth partg
7: n  Li2[1;v] ni
8: for i 2 [1; v] do
9: oi  Lj2Bi nj
10: end for
11: output message parts o o1jjo2jj : : : jjovjjn
3.2 Inverse Transformation
Randomized version of the inverse transformation algorithm T   in the CMD
= (B, R, H, T , T  ) accepts v + 1 output message parts o = o1jjo2jj : : : jjovjjn
and the block design based on the GQ(s; t) with v = (s + 1)(st + 1) objects,
b = (t+ 1)(st+ 1) blocks and v super blocks as illustrated in Figure 1. Overall
algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 2. In step 1, salt s is recovered as the vth
message part by adding output message parts referred by the super block Bv.
Through steps 2 to 4, each message part mi is recovered by adding hash of
the salt and the message part sequence number, n and output message parts
referred by the super block Bi for all i 2 [1; v   1]. Result of the randomized
inverse transformation is the original input message parts m = m1jj : : : jjmv 1.
Algorithm 2 also species an alternative inverse transformation for steps 1 and
3 which uses P n Bi (with s2t + 1 elements) instead of tjhe super block Bi
(with s(t + 1) elements)to refer output message parts to be added to recover
input message part mi. An example of the randomized inverse transformation
algorithm for GQ(2,2) is provided in the Appendix B.
Algorithm 2 Randomized Inverse Transformation
Require: GQ(s; t) with super blocks fB1; B2; : : : ; Bvg from Algorithm 3
Require: H(; ) fhash functiong
Require: output message o = o1jjo2jj : : : jjovjjn from Algorithm 1
1: s n Lj2Bv oj falternatively s n Lj2PnBv ojg
2: for i 2 [1; v   1] do
3: mi  nH(s; i)Lj2Bi oj falternatively mi  nH(s; i)Lj2PnBi ojg
4: end for
5: input message parts m m1jjm2jj : : : jjmv 1
4 Analysis
4.1 Correctness and Complexity
Correctness property requires that the input message which is transformed by the
Randomized Transformation Algorithm 1 can be reconstructed by Randomized
Inverse Transformation Algorithm 2. We would like to show the correctness of
our transformations such that for all m 2 f0; 1g:
[o T (B;H(R; );m)] and [m0  T  (B;H(; ); o)] ) [m = m0]:
Transformation T consists of following two stages (Algorithm 1):
Randomization: nv  s R(f0; 1g) (the salt)
ni  mi H(sjji) for all i 2 [1; v   1]
Transformation: oi  
L
j2Bi nj for all i 2 [1; v]
ov+1  n  
L
j2[1;v] nj (the sum)
Inverse transformation T   consists of following two stages (Algorithm 2):
Inverse Transformation: n  ov+1
ni  n 
L
j2Bi oj for all i 2 [1; v]
s nv
De-randomization: m0i  ni H(sjji) for all i 2 [1; v   1]
Randomization and de-randomization are achieved by adding (xor)
hash of the salt and the message part sequence number (H(sjji)) to each mes-
sage part. A distinct salt value is generated for each transformation. Salt value
is appended and transformed together with randomized message parts. Hence,
correctness of the randomization and de-randomization depends on the recovery
of the correct salt during inverse transformation.
Transformation and inverse transformation are based on super blocks
from the generalized quadrangles representing symmetric point-line incidence re-
lation in a projective space. For obtaining output message part oi, randomized
input message parts referred by the super block Bi is added as oi  
L
l2Bi nl.
Inverse transformation recovers randomized input message part ni by adding out-
put message parts referred by the same super block Bi as ni  n 
L
j2Bi oj
with an additional term of n. Correctness of overall dispersal scheme can be
shown by proving ni = n
 Lj2Bi oj for i 2 [1; v] for all input messages. By
replacing oj =
L
l2Bj nl and n
 =
L
f2[1;v] nf , we obtain following equation:
ni =
M
f2[1;v]
nf 
M
j2Bi
M
l2Bj
nl for all i 2 [1; v]
Right side of the equation can be interpreted as the addition (xor) of all ran-
domized message parts referred by all the super sets of the elements of the super
set Bi. Assume that s(t+1) elements (Proof of Proposition 1) of the superset Bi
be fi1; : : : ; is(t+1)g, then the equation can be rewritten as:
M
f2[1;v]
nf  ni =
0@M
l2Bi1
nl 
M
l2Bi2
nl  : : :
M
l2Bis(t+1)
nl
1A for all i 2 [1; v]
Proposition 2 states that super sets fBi1 ; : : : ; Bis(t+1)g should refer each mes-
sage part at least once. Properties 2, 3 and 5 of the Proposition 3 state that super
sets fBi1 ; : : : ; Bis(t+1)g should have (1) i as their elements s(t+1) times, (2) each
j 2 Bi as their elements (s  1) times, and (3) each j 2 P nBi as their elements
(t+1) times. Given GQ(s; t) with even s and t values, s(t+1) is an even number
while (s  1) and (t+ 1) are all odd numbers. Hence, right part of the equation
has the message part ni added (xor) even number of times, and all other message
parts are added (xor) odd number of times resulting in the following equation
proving the correctness of our combinatorial transformation scheme.
M
f2[1;v]
nf  ni = (n1  : : : ni 1  ni+1  : : : nv) for all i 2 [1; v]
Correctness discussion also holds for the alternative inverse transformation step
(Algorithm 2, steps 1 and 3). Properties 1, 2, 4 and 6 of the Proposition 3 state
that super sets fBi1 ; : : : ; Bis2t+1g referred by the super set P n Bi should have
(1) i as their elements 0 times (properties 1 and 2), (2) each j 2 Bi as their
elements (st+ 1) times (property 4), and (3) each j 2 P n Bi as their elements
(s 1)(t+1) times (property 6). Given GQ(s; t) with even s and t values, (st+1)
and (s  1)(t+ 1) are both odd numbers.
Complexity of our combinatorial message dispersal scheme CMD = (B, R,
H, T , T  ) consists of the complexities of the three components: design algorithm
B, transformation algorithm T and inverse transformation algorithm T  . First of
all, CMD appends two parts to each message: salt and sum; therefore, it increases
the message size with a factor of 2v . Construction of generalized quadrangles (GQ)
is summarized in Algorithm 3 of the Appendix A with an overall running time of
O(v2) = O(s4t2). Randomized transformation in the Algorithm 1 randomizes the
input message parts through steps 3 to 5 in O(v), creates a sum of randomized
parts in step 7 in O(v), and nally transforms randomized parts through steps
8 to 10 in O(v(t + 1)s) = O(s3t2). Inverse transformation in the Algorithm 2
recovers salt, randomized message parts and input message parts through steps
1 to 4 in O(v(t+ 1)s) = O(s3t2).
4.2 Security
Use cases for combinatorial message dispersal scheme CMD covers communi-
cation and data storage domain. First scenario targets communication networks
with redundant links so that it is possible to establish distinct paths between
a source and destination pair as in [4]. Using CMD, source node disperses the
message m into v output message parts and sends each part through a distinct
path. Second scenario involves storage of data on independent storage sites as in
[5], [6], [7], [8] and [9]. Only the person with correct ordered list of storage sites
and access permissions can recover the data.
Adversarial model of this paper is based on a passive adversary who can
access at most k  1 communication links or k  1 storage sites. We assume that
the adversary has the knowledge and capability to run combinatorial message
dispersal scheme CMD algorithms: block design B (Algorithm 3), pseudo random
number generator R, hash H, randomized transformation T (Algorithm 1) and
randomized inverse transformation T   (Algorithm 2). But, adversary can not
control or monitor choices made be the message source for the salt and the
specic block design out of v! isomorphic designs. Adversary can not monitor
communication leaving source or destination.
Indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2)
holds for combinatorial message dispersal scheme CMD under our use cases and
adversarial assumptions. Consider the security GAMEIND CCA2CMD;A;OT ;OT  between
a challenger running CMD scheme, a probabilistic polynomial time adversary
A, an oracle OT capable of applying randomized transformation on any input
message to return output message parts and an oracle OT   capable of apply-
ing randomized inverse transformation on any set of k   1 output message part
to return the original message. (1) Challenger generates a salt s  R(f0; 1g),
a design B  R(B) and a bit b  R(f0; 1g). (2) Attacker is given access to
both oracles OT and OT   . (3) Adversary chooses any two messages m0;m1
and submits them to challenger. (4) Challenger applies randomized transforma-
tion T using s and B on the message mb and generates output message parts
o1; : : : ; ov+1. (5) Adversary receives part ov+1 = n
 and can choose to access any
set of k  1 data parts (a.k.a. communication links) oi1 ; : : : ; oik 1 . (6) Adversary
can make further calls to both oracles OT and OT   . (7) Adversary outputs the
value of b after polynomial number of steps. Best chance for the adversary is to
submit m0 = f0gjmj and m1 = f1gjmj and try all possible salt values using the
oracle OT   in 2s = 2
jmj
v steps. Hence, adversary gains no advantage in winning
the game.
Security of the combinatorial message dispersal scheme CMD depends on
the value k = s(t+ 1) where by accessing less than k   1 output message parts
adversary can not recover any message part. Recovery of an input message part
requires recovery of the sum n and the salt value nv = s in addition to k output
message parts. Once the sum and the salt is recovered, mi = n
  H(s; i) L
j2D nj where D = B
i referring to jBij = s(t + 1) output message parts or
D = P n Bi referring to jP n Bij = (s2t + 1) output message parts. In CMD,
no sets with k  1 or less output message parts give adversary any advantage in
recovering the input message part mi. We show that by constructing a minimum
size set Di of output message parts and show that this set is Bi for any i 2 [1; v].
Construction starts with selecting a point i in GQ. We nd all the lines
fL1; : : : ; Lt+1g incident with the point i. Due to Axioms 1 and 2, these lines are
incident with s(t + 1) other points ffi11; : : : ; i1sg; : : : ; fit+11 ; : : : ; it+1s gg where irl
means point il is incident with the line Lr. Due to Axiom 3, any point which
is not incident with these lines, should be incident with the same line as ex-
actly one point in fir1; : : : ; irsg for all r 2 [1; t + 1]. Hence, picking any line
Lr 2 fL1; : : : ; Lt+1g and selecting all the lines incident with the points on this
line covers all the points in the design once except points in fi; ir1; : : : ; irsg will
be covered s (even) times. This is an undesired condition to recover message
mi. Removing lines passing through point i from this selection results in s
(even) times i and odd times all other points except points incident with the
lines in fL1; : : : ; Lt+1g n fLrg. Hence, lines incident with the points on all of
fL1; : : : ; Lt+1g must be selected. In this case: (1) points incident with the same
line as i will appear s   1 (odd) times, (2) points which are not incident with
the same line as i will appear t + 1 (odd) times, and (3) point i will appear
s(t+1) (even) times. This fullls the rst one of the two requirements to recover
input message part mi: (1) even ( or zero) number of times i and odd number of
times other points, or (2) odd number of times i and even number of times other
points. Selection of super sets corresponding to all the points that are incident
with the same line as point i is actually denition of the super set Bi. Hence,
for k = jBij = s(t+1), collection of k  1 or less output message parts does not
reveal any information about input message part mi for i 2 [1; v   1].
5 Related Work
Contribution of the paper is relevant to variety of research topics including se-
cure deduplication, all-or-nothing-transformation, secret sharing, and dispersed
storage. Secure deduplication deals with storing single secure copy of le up-
loaded by many owner. Recently in [10], a keyless encryption solution: message
locked encryption (MLE) is presented. MLE is a deterministic scheme where the
le is encrypted by using a key derived using the le itself such as hash of the
le.
Secret sharing problem investigates distribution of data among a set of
participants to ensure security and redundancy. Originally proposed in [11] by
Shamir and [12] by Blakley, a (k; v)-threshold secret sharing scheme is based
on the polynomial interpolation where recovery of the secret by Lagrange's in-
terpolation takes O(k3) in worst case. Erasure codes based secret sharing in
[13] reduces storage and communication overhead but it provides less security
as repeated values in the data may provide capability for attackers to estimate
missing shares. Hence, this scheme usually requires additional encryption and
signature for data protection. Combination of both schemes in [14] benets from
the perfect security of Shamir's scheme, and improved performance of Rabin's
scheme. The scheme encrypts the data with a symmetric key, disperses the key
with Shamir's scheme, and disperses the encrypted data with Rabin's scheme. Se-
cret sharing based on access structures is proposed by Ito, Saito and Nishizeki in
[15] [16]. They assume a set of v sites fS1; : : : ; Svg such that any k sites can pool
their shares to recover the data. Scheme rst generates the set B = fB1; : : : ; Bbg
consisting of all possible k 1 subsets of v sites where b =   vk 1. Data is divided
into b parts fP1; : : : ; Pbg and each site Si receives the sets of parts fPijSi =2 Big
(1  i  b). Any k sites can combine their parts to construct the data. Scheme
provides perfect security if shares are randomly generated for each word.
Dispersed storage applications based on secret sharing by Inter-
memory [17], Myriad [6], Pond [8], DHash [18] , Cleversafe [19], Glacier [5],
Tahoe-LAFS [20], FreeHaven [21] and AONT-RS [22] use erasure codes based
threshold scheme. AONT-RS blends All-Or-Nothing Transform (AONT) with
the erasure codes. While AONT transform achieves computational security for
the data, modied Rabin's scheme introduce computational advantages in inner
matrix multiplication and matrix inversion. PASIS [7] and POTSHARDS [9] are
based on the threshold secret sharing scheme which provides perfect security at
increased storage and computation overhead. GridSharing [23] proposes to use
secret sharing schemes together with replication techniques.
Combinatorial message dispersal scheme extends the message with a factor
of 2v  jmj which is much lower than the threshold secret sharing based schemes
distributing v of size jmj shares. Shamir's scheme is based on the Lagrange's
interpolation which takes O(k3), O(s3t3) converted to our parameters. This is
higher than our transformation algorithm and equivalent to generalized quad-
rangles construction algorithm which should run only once. Similar to security
of the Shamir's scheme, in our scheme adversary accessing less than k data parts
can not recover any parts of the message.
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A Construction of Generalized Quadrangles GQ(s,t)
The three GQ(s; t) are incidence relations between points and lines in projective
spaces PG(d; q) and PG(d; q2) with dimension d. A point is a vector X =<
x0; x1; x2; : : : ; xd > in GF (q) for PG(d; q) and in GF (q
2) for PG(d; q2). GQ
construction algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 3 for the design parameters
listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Generalized Quadrangles design parameters [2, 3].
Design s t jBj = b jP j = v
GQ(q; q) q q q3 + q2 + q + 1 q3 + q2 + q + 1
GQ(q; q2) q q2 q5 + q3 + q2 + 1 q4 + q3 + q + 1
GQ(q2; q3) q2 q3 q8 + q5 + q3 + 1 q7 + q5 + q2 + 1
Algorithm 3 GQ Design
Require: Type fGQ(s,t) typeg
Require: N ftotal number of blocksg
1: Find minimum prime power q s.t. b  N ; fTable 1g
2: Find the set P of v = (s+ 1)(st+ 1) points holding the canonical equation;
3: For each point a, generate the set of points collinear with a.
4: Construct the set B of b = (t+ 1)(st+ 1) lines each incident (I) with s+ 1 points.
5: For each x 2 P , construct a super block Bx = f8y 2 P j9M 2 B and x I M I yg.
GQ(q; q) consists of the point and lines of the projective space PG(4; q) with
canonical equation Q(X) = x20 + x1x2 + x3x4 = 0.
GQ(q; q2) comes from PG(5; q) with canonical equation Q(X) = f(x0; x1)+
x2x3 + x4x5 = 0 where f(x0; x1) is an irreducible binary quadratic of the form
f(x0; x1) = c x
2
0 + x0 x1 + x
2
1. If q is even, c is a number in GF (q) so that
y2 + y + c = 0 has no root. If q is odd, c is a number in GF (q) so that
(1   4 c) is not a square.
GQ(q2; q3) is fromH(4; q2) which is a nonsingular hermitian variety of PG(4; q2)
with canonical equation Q(X) = xq+10 + x
q+1
1 + x
q+1
2 + x
q+1
3 + x
q+1
4 = 0.
A point a =< a0; a1; : : : ; ad > is in the projective space PG(d; s) with the
canonical equation Q(X) = 0 if Q(a) = 0. Points a and b are said to be
collinear (a ? b) if B(a; b) = 0 where B(a; b) = Q(c)   Q(a)   Q(b) for
c =< a0+ b0; a1+ b1; : : : ; ad+ bd >. Let a
? represents the set of points collinear
with point a, then (a?
T
b?) is a line connecting two distinct and collinear
points a and b [2].
Complexity of the Algorithm 3 is as follows. In step 2, v = (s + 1)(st + 1)
points in the projective space PG(d; s) are generated for GQ(s; t) in O(sd+2). In
step 3, a? for each point a is generated in O(v2). In step 4, b = (t+ 1)(st+ 1)
lines with s + 1 points are generated by checking (a?
T
b?) for pairs of points
in O(stb). Thus, overall running time of the algorithm is O(v2) = O(s4t2).
B Combinatorial Dispersal Scheme based on GQ(2,2)
Randomized transformation algorithm is illustrated in the Figure 2 (top)
which is based on the generalized quadrangle GQ(2,2) of the Example 1. Ran-
domized transformation uses the super blocks fB1; : : : ; B15g of the Example 2.
It results in a XOR transformation structure which maps input message with 14
parts (m1; : : : ;m14) and salt into output message with 15 parts o1; : : : ; o15 and
a sum n of randomized input message parts (n1; : : : ; n15). Randomization is
achieved by adding (xor) hash of the salt and a counter to each input message
part.
Randomized inverse transformation algorithm is illustrated in the
Figure 2 (bottom) which is based on the generalized quadrangle GQ(2,2) of the
Example 1. Randomized transformation uses the super blocks fB1; : : : ; B15g of
the Example 2. Example accepts output message parts from the example of
the Figure 2. It results in a XOR transformation structure which maps output
message with 15 parts (o1; : : : ; o15) and the sum n
 of randomized input message
parts (n1; : : : ; n15) into input message with 14 parts m1; : : : ;m14. Alternative
inverse transformation of Algorithm 2 (steps 1 and 3) can be obtained by adding
(xor) of parts referred by P nBi instead of Bi for each row. For example, nn1
= o1  o2  o4  o6  o8  o10  o12  o14  o15.
Fig. 2. Randomized transformation T (Algorithm 1 - top ) and randomized inverse
transformation T   (Algorithm 2 - bottom) of our combinatorial message dispersal
scheme based on the generalized quadrangle GQ(2,2). GQ(2,2) with 15 blocks and 15
objects.
